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Recent Decisions
LABOR LAW-FEDERAL PREEMPTION-PENSION AND RETIREMENT
PLANS-The Supreme Court of the United States has held that prior
to ERISA, a state's power to regulate pension plans by imposing
minimum vesting and funding requirements more stringent than
those contained in a collective bargaining agreement was not
preempted by federal labor policy.
Malone v. White Motor Corporation, 435 U.S. 497 (1978).
Plaintiff, White Motor Corporation (White Motor), owned and
operated two farm equipment manufacturing plants in Hopkins and
Minneapolis, Minnesota.. The employees at these plants were cov-
ered by a pension plan that was the product of negotiations between
White Motor and the International Union, United Automobile,
Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW),
the employees' representative.' The 1971 version of the plan pro-
vided that no employee had any vested right to benefits prior to
retirement and that pension benefits were payable out of plan funds
only.3 During the 1968 and 1971 contract negotiations, White Motor
executed pension guarantees, which provided that upon termination
of the pension plan, benefits were guaranteed by the company at a
designated level. By giving the guarantees, White Motor assumed
a direct liability of approximately $7 million.'
Because of substantial losses incurred at the plants, White Motor
closed its Minneapolis plant in June, 1972. 5 White Motor attempted
to terminate the pension plan on June 30, 1972,1 but the UAW
1. White Motor Corp. v. Malone, 412 F. Supp. 372, 373 (D. Minn.), rev'd, 545 F.2d 599
(8th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 435 U.S. 497 (1978).
2. The employees had been represented by the UAW since 1955. Id. at 373-74.
3. The plan also provided for deferred funding of past service liability (the excess of the
accrued liability of the pension fund over the present value of the assets of the fund) by
amortizing it over a period of thirty-five years. This unpaid service liability was to be met
through contributions by the employer from its continuous operations. Thus, when the plan
was terminated, the pension fund could not increase, and some past service liability remained
unfunded. Id. at 373-74.
4. Id. at 374.
5. At the time the Minneapolis plant was closed, the past service liability of the pension
plan was $14 million. Id. at 375.
6. Section 10.02 of the pension plan provided that "the Company shall have the sole right
at any time to terminate the entire plan." Id. at 374.
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successfully challenged this action and the plan was not terminated
until May 1, 1974.1
While the union's challenge to the company's attempt to termi-
nate the pension plan was pending in the courts, the Minnesota
Legislature enacted the Private Pension Benefit Protection Act
(Pension Act), which established minimum standards for the fund-
ing and vesting of employee pensions.' White Motor was notified by
Defendant E.I. Malone, State Commissioner of Labor and Industry,
that in order to achieve compliance with the Pension Act, a pension
funding charge of more than $19 million was necessary. White
Motor filed suit in the United States District Court for the District
of Minnesota, seeking declaratory relief holding the Pension Act
unconstitutional Plaintiff moved for summary judgment or, in the
alternative, for a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the
Pension Act. The motion was premised upon the argument that the
Pension Act conflicted with provisions and policies of the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA),15 and was thus preempted by the
supremacy clause of the United States Constitution." Plaintiff con-
tended that the Pension Act interfered with the free collective bar-
gaining process mandated by the NLRA, in that it imposed obliga-
tions upon the company which, by the terms of its collective bar-
gaining agreement with the UAW, it was not required to assume. 2
The district court denied White Motor's motion for injunctive
7. Id. at 375. The union contended that the company could not terminate the pension plan
until the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement. An arbitrator's decision and
subsequent litigation upheld this contention, and the plan was not terminated until May 1,
1974. See International Union, UAW v. White Motor Corp., 505 F.2d 1193 (8th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 921 (1975).
8. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 181B.01-.17 (Supp. 1976) (effective April 10, 1974). According to
the provisions of the Pension Act, any employer who ceased to operate a place of business or
a pension plan would owe a "pension funding charge" to any employee who had completed
ten or more years of credited service under a pension plan. In contrast to the provisions of
White Motor's pension plan, which provided that benefits be paid only out of the pension
fund, the Pension Act declared the amount of the charge to be a lien upon the employer's
assets, and that any deficiency in the pension fund would be satisfied from the general funds
of the employer.
9. White Motor's complaint, as amended, asserted violations of the supremacy, contract,
due process and equal protection clauses of the United States Constitution. Malone v. White
Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 502 (1978).
10. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-187 (1970).
11. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
12. 412 F. Supp. at 375. Compare the requirements of the Minnesota Pension Act dis-
cussed at note 8 supra, with the provisions of White Motor's collectively bargained plan
discussed at note 3 and acompanying text supra.
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relief and refused to declare the Pension Act invalid on preemption
grounds. 3 The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Cir-
cuit reversed, holding that the Pension Act directly intruded upon
the employer's substantive obligations under a pension plan that
was freely negotiated through the collective bargaining process, and
thus the Pension Act was preempted by federal labor law." The
defendant appealed, and the United States Supreme Court noted
probable jurisdiction."
The Supreme Court reversed," holding that the NLRA does not
preclude a state from regulating the substantive terms of pension
plans, including those plans that are a product of collective bargain-
ing." In an opinion written by Justice White, the Court focused
13. 412 F. Supp. at 382. The district court concluded that the Pension Act did not inter-
fere with the employer's duty to bargain over pensions, and that the collective bargaining
process would not be frustrated by the State's regulation of the substantive terms of employee
pension plans. Id. at 381-82.
The district court was persuaded by the provisions and legislative history of the Welfare
and Pension Plans Disclosure Act (Pension Disclosure Act), 29 U.S.C. § § 301-309 (1970), that
Congress intended for the states to have the power to regulate pension plan operations and
administration. 412 F. Supp. at 380.
14. White Motor Corp. v. Malone, 545 F.2d 599 (8th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 435 U.S. 497 (1978).
In reversing the district court, the court of appeals relied upon the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Lodge 76, Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n., 427
U.S. 132 (1976), for the proposition that neither the states nor the NLRB have the power to
influence the substantive terms of collective bargaining agreements through regulation of the
conduct of the parties to collective bargaining negotiations. The court of appeals then rea-
soned that "[if states cannot control the economic weapons of the parties at the bargaining
table, a fortiori, they may not directly control the substantive terms of the contract which
results from that bargaining." 545 F.2d at 606.
The court of appeals also relied on Local 24, Int'l. Bhd. of Teamsters v. Oliver, 358 U.S.
283 (1959), in which the Supreme Court refused to apply a state antitrust law to the provisions
of a collective bargaining agreement. Unlike the district court, which limited Oliver to anti-
trust statutes, the court of appeals read the decision broadly as standing for the proposition
that "a state cannot modify or change an otherwise valid and effective provision of a collective
bargaining agreement." 545 F.2d at 608.
Finally, the court of appeals rejected the contention that the Pension Disclosure Act au-
thorized the states to change substantive terms of pension plan agreements. The court con-
cluded that the preemption disclaimer, § 10(b) of the Pension Disclosure Act, merely allowed
a state to maintain its existing power to regulate the management, administration and opera-
tion of employee benefit funds. Id. at 609.
15. 434 U.S. 813 (1977).
16. Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497 (1978).
17. In a 4-3 decision (Blackmun and Brennan, JJ., not participating), the Court made it
clear that they were dealing solely with plaintiff's argument that the Minnesota statute was
preempted by federal labor laws. The case was remanded for the district court to consider
the other constitutional issues raised by White Motor in its complaint, including the conten-
tions that the Minnesota Pension Act impaired contractual obligations and violated the due
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primarily on the intent of Congress, as reflected in the Pension
Disclosure Act. 8 Citing Retail Clerks International Association v.
Schermerhorn,5 the Court began its analysis with the proposition
that when Congress is silent on the question of whether it intends
to preempt state laws by its legislation, the courts should sustain
the local laws unless these laws conflict with the federal regulation,
or the congressional intent to preempt state regulation can be im-
plied from the scope and pervasiveness of the federal legislation."
The Court noted that the mere fact that the Pension Act touches
the interrelationships between employees, employers and unions
does not automatically compel the conclusion that the Pension Act
is preempted by the NLRA.21 Quoting from its decision in Garner
v. Teamsters Local 776,22 the Court postulated that the NLRA
leaves much more room for state regulation, and that it is the duty
of the courts to ascertain the areas in which state regulation is
permissible.2 3 Although acknowledging that pension plans are man-
datory subjects of collective bargaining, the Court nevertheless
found no express language in the NLRA that would preclude all
state regulation in this area.24 Therefore, if the Pension Act was to
process clause of the Constitution. 435 U.S. at 514-15. In another case involving similar
questions, the Supreme Court ruled that the Pension Act did impair contractual obligations
in violation of the contract clause. See Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 98 S. Ct. 2716
(1978).
18. The Pension Disclosure Act was expressly repealed by the Employee Retirement In-
come Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1031(a)(1) (Supp. V 1975). The repeal, however, did
not take effect until January 1, 1975, after the operative events of this case.
19. 375 U.S. 96 (1963) (holding that in preemption cases, if Congress has manifested its
intent, courts must give effect to that intent).
20. 435 U.S. at 504. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947) (presump-
tion is against preemption unless a clear congressional intent to preempt is present). Recent
decisions are indicative of the growing reluctance of the Supreme Court to imply this congres-
sional intent to preempt state laws. See generally Catz and Lenard, The Demise of the
Implied Federal Preemption Doctrine, 4 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 295 (1977). See also Ray v.
Atlantic Richfield Co., 98 S. Ct. 988 (1978) (state statute regulating design, size and move-
ment of oil tankers is preempted by Federal Ports and Waterways Safety Act, but only to
the extent that there is an actual conflict between provisions of the two statutes).
21. 435 U.S. at 504 (quoting Amalgamated Ass'n. of Street, Electric Railway and Motor
Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274 (1971)).
22. 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
23. 435 U.S. at 504.
24. Id. Sections 8(a)(5) and 8(a)(3) of the NLRA require employers and unions to bargain
in good faith with respect to wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment.
See Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948) (firmly established the principle
that a pension plan is a proper subject for collective bargaining). See also NLRB v. Niles-
Bement-Pond Co., 199 F.2d. 713 (2d Cir. 1952) (holding that "wages" includes pension and
retirement plans).
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be preempted, the requisite congressional intent would have to be
implied.21
After an extensive review of the provisions and legislative history
of the Pension Disclosure Act, the Court concluded that not only did
Congress not intend to preempt state regulation of pension plans,
but also that the Pension Disclosure Act anticipated a wide regula-
tory role for the States. Unlike the court of appeals, which found
that the preemption disclaimer in the Pension Disclosure Act re-
lated only to state statutes governing civil and criminal liabilities
for misappropriation and misuse of pension trust funds," the Su-
preme Court was persuaded that this preemption disclaimer ex-
pressly reserved to the states the power to regulate the substantive
terms of pension plan agreements.s
Looking to the objectives of the Pension Disclosure Act as re-
flected in its legislative history, the Court found that the 1958 Act
was only the first step in protecting the workers' interest in their
pensions.21 The Court believed that this statute was designed to deal
only with the disclosure aspects of pension plans, leaving regulatory
responsibility with the States.30 Since an examination of the legisla-
tive history also reflected that Congress was aware of the problems
of unfair vesting requirements, inadequate funding, and unexpected
termination, 3' the Court reasoned that Congress' failure to deal with
25. See note 20 and accompanying text supra.
26. 435 U.S. at 512.
27. See note 14 supra.
28. 435 U.S. at 505. Section 10(b) of the Pension Disclosure Act reads:
The provisions of this Act, except subsection (a) of this section, and any action taken
thereunder, shall not be held to exempt or relieve any person from any liability, duty,
penalty, or punishment provided by any present or future law of the United States or
of any State affecting the operation or administration of employee welfare or pension
benefit plans, or in any manner to authorize the operation or administration of any
such plan contrary to any such law.
Also, the Court felt that Section 10(a) of the Pension Disclosure Act indicated congressional
intent to allow the States to maintain their regulatory power over pension plans. Section 10(a)
provides in relevant part:
"Nothing contained in this subsection shall be construed to prevent any State from obtaining
such additional information relating to any such plan as it may desire, or from otherwise
regulating such plan."
29. 435 U.S. at 506. The Court found support for this conclusion in the Senate Report on
the bill, S. REP. No. 1440, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. reprinted in [1958] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 4137 [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 1440], as well as in floor comments made by
supporters of the bill. 435 U.S. at 507-09.
30. 435 U.S. at 507. See S. REP. No. 1440, supra note 29, at 4153-54.
31. S. RP. No. 1440, supra note 29, at 4150-52.
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these problems indicated an intent to leave this regulation to the
States.32 The Court also found in the legislative history a congres-
sional awareness that the Pension Disclosure Act would apply to
pension plans that were the product of collective bargaining.33
Finally, because of the broad language employed by the Supreme
Court in its decision in Local 24, International Brotherhood of
Teamsters v. Oliver," which indicated that a State was precluded
from regulating the substantive terms of a collective bargaining
agreement, the Court was forced to find a method of reconciling its
decision in Malone with Oliver.3 Toward that end, Justice White
noted that the Oliver decision clearly provided for an exception to
the preemption doctrine if Congress indicated that the solutions
arrived at by the parties were within the reach of a state's regulatory
power. 3 According to Justice White, the Pension Disclosure Act
implied this congressional approval of state regulation, and there-
fore the Malone decision, resting primarily on this approval, was not
inconsistent with Oliver.7
Justice Stewart, in his dissent, maintained that the majority, in
implying congressional authorization of Minnesota's statutory mod-
ification of an existing collective bargaining agreement, did so on
the basis of Congress' failure to enact its own substantive regula-
32. 435 U.S. at 510. Thus, as is pointed out in both dissenting opinions, the Court rested
its justification for upholding the Minnesota Pension Act not on an affirmative expression of
congressional intent, but on an inference of congressional intent drawn from Congress' failure
to enact substantive regulations for pension plans at the time the Pension Disclosure Act was
enacted. See notes 38 and 43 and accompanying text infra.
33. 435 U.S. at 508 n.9. According to the Court, "neither the bill as enacted nor its
legislative history drew a distinction between collectively bargained and all other plans, either
with regard to the disclosure role of the federal legislation or the regulatory functions that
would remain with the States." Id. at 508-09.
34. 358 U.S. 283, 295-96 (1959). In Oliver the Court held that a state antitrust law could
not be applied to prohibit the parti s from carrying out the terms of a collective bargaining
agreement. In so holding, the Court recognized that Congress had provided for a scheme of
federal law applicable to the response of the parties in their duty to bargain collectively, and
that "there is no room in this scheme for the application here of this state policy limiting the
solutions that the parties' agreement can provide to the problems of wages and working
conditions." Id. at 296.
35. The district court, in its decision, circumvented the Oliver doctrine by limiting the
decision to state ant'trust statutes. White Motor Corp. v. Malone, 412 F. Supp. at 381. The
court of appeals, in reversing, followed the broad language in Oliver. See note 14 supra.
36. 435 U.S. at 513. The implication in Oliver is that preemption occurs only when "[the
solution worked out by the parties [is] not one of a sort which Congress has indicated may
be left to prohibition by the several States." 358 U.S. at 296.
'7. 435 U.S. at 44.
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tions of pension plans. He was not convinced that such an inference,
drawn from what Congress failed to enact, was sufficient to override
federal labor policy by placing restrictions on the parties' solutions
to mandatory subjects of collective bargaining.18
Expanding upon the principles discussed by Justice Stewart, Jus-
tice Powell, in a separate dissent, expressed concern regarding the
restrictive effect that application of the Minnesota Pension Act
would have on the collective bargaining process.3' He stated that the
Pension Act created a conflict between a federally sanctioned labor
agreement and a state policy which sought to adjust commercial
relationships," and tha, the state statute was therefore necessarily
preempted by federal law." He was also troubled by the retroactive
application of the Pension Act to an existing labor agreement. Ac-
cording to Justice Powell, had the parties known of this statutory
development, the provisions of the plan would likely have been
different. 2 He concluded that the States may not change the eco-
nomic bargain struck by the parties at the bargaining table by alter-
ing the terms of existing collective bargaining agreements on man-
datory subjects of collective bargaining, at least not without a
clearer indication of congressional authorization than the majority
found in the Pension Disclosure Act."
Since Congress began legislating in the area of labor relations, the
Supreme Court has been faced with the problem of deciding when
38. Id. at 515-16 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
39. Id. at 516. Powell argued that application of the Pension Act, which restricted the
available options to either no pension or a fully funded pension that vests after ten years of
service, could discourage employer participation in retirement planning. Id.
40. Id. at 516. (Powell, J., dissenting). A well-recognized exception to the preemption
doctrine is state policy dealing with local health or safety regulations. See, e.g., Farmer v.
Carpenters, Local 25, 430 U.S. 290 (1977), discussed at note 48 infra. It has been suggested
that the test is "whether the state law regulates labor relations in order to adjust conflicts of
interest between employers and employees or seeks to protect other interests which the state
deems paramount and whose advancement only collaterally affects issues of labor policy."
Cox and Seidman, Federalism and Labor Relations, 64 HAav. L. Rav. 211, 242 (1950). Of
course, if the federal statute involved expressly superseded all related state law, preemption
should occur regardless of any possible exceptions to the preemption doctrine. See, e.g., §
1144 of ERISA.
41. Powell argued that the Pension Act did not fall within the health and safety excep-
tion. 435 U.S. at 516 (Powell, J., dissenting). The majority, because they decided the preemp-
tion issue on the basis of the Pension Disclosure Act, specifically stated that they did not pass
on appellant's contention that the Minnesota statute was within the exception. Id. at 513
n.13.
42. Id. at 516-17. (Powell, J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 517-18.
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state statutes are preempted by federal labor law. After more than
two decades of experimenting with different approaches to the
issue," the Court, in 1959, enunciated a broad preemption doctrine
in San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon.1 The test an-
nounced by the Court was that if an activity is "arguably subject"
to Section 7 or Section 8 of the NLRA, both the States and the
federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the
NLRB.'6 Thus, after Garmon, the preemption doctrine applied to
invalidate state regulation not only when it actually conflicted with
federal labor policy, but also if there was even a potential conflict.
With some modifications, 7 the Garmon rule has proved to be a
workable one and is still employed by the Court."8 An examination
44. One test which the Court applied was whether the Federal Act had so occupied the
field as to preclude state regulation. See, e.g., Garner v. Teamsters Local 776, 346 U.S. 485
(1953). Another test was whether the state regulation was in direct conflict with the national
regulatory scheme. See, e.g., Motor Coach Employees Div. 998 v. Wisconsin Employment
Relations Bd., 340 U.S. 383 (1951); Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538 (1945). A third test, an.
nounced in UAW Local 232 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 245 (1949),
permitted the state courts to determine whether the activity at issue was protected under
Section 7 or prohibited under Section 8 of the NLRA. This case was expressly overruled by
Lodge 76 International Association of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Com-
mission, 427 U.S. 132, 155 (1976). See generally Cox, Labor Law Preemption: Revisited, 85
HAv. L. REv. 1337 (1972); 18A T. KHEEL, BusiNEss ORoANIZATIONS 9.02 (1978).
45. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
46. Id. at 244-45. The Court in Garmon and in subsequent decisions, carved out two
important exceptions to this "arguably subject" rule. First, federal labor policy does not
preclude states from regulating activities involving deeply rooted local interests. See, e.g.,
Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967) (union duty of fair representation regarded as touching
deeply rooted local interests). Second, federal labor law does not preempt state regulation
that is of a mere peripheral concern to the federal law. See, e.g., International Ass'n. of
Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617, 620 (1959) (state court is not precluded from ordering
reinstatement of expelled union member since there exists only a "remote possibility" of
conflict with the NLRB's enforcement of national labor policy). See generally Hooton, The
Exceptional Garmon Doctrine, 26 LAB. L.J. 49 (1975).
47. The Supreme Court in Teamsters Local 20 v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252 (1964), modified
the preemption doctrine by holding that even when acitvity was not arguably protected by §
7 or arguably prohibited by § 8, state regulation was precluded if the Court found that by
not regulating the activity, Congress intended that it be free from regulation. This principle
was later applied in Lodge 76, Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 427 U.S.
132 (1976), in which the Court held that "Congress meant to leave some activities to be
controlled by the free play of economic forces." Id. at 144.
48. See, e.g., Amalgamated Ass'n of Street, Electric Railway and Motor Coach Employees
v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274 (1971). See also Lesnick, Preemption Reconsidered: The Apparent
Reaffirmation of Garmon, 72 COLUM. L. REv. 469 (1972).
In spite of this apparent vitality of Garmon, however, there appears to be an increasing
willingness on the part of the present Supreme Court to circumvent the preemption doctrine
by attaching increasing importance to the states' rights to regulate local activities. For exam-
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of other Garmon-type preemption cases reveals that almost all of
these prior cases dealt with a state's attempted regulation of
conduct potentially subject to the provisions of the NLRA. The
question presented in each instance was whether a state's regulation
of the economic weapons available to parties to collective bargain-
ing, through the regulation of the employer's or employees' conduct,
was preempted by federal labor law. The question presented to the
Court in Malone, on the other hand, involved a state's attempt to
limit the possible solutions available to parties at the bargaining
table by imposing minimum requirements on the substantive terms
of collective bargaining agreements." Application of the Garmon
test by asking whether this is "arguably subject" to NLRB jurisdic-
tion is of little assistance in a Malone situation since the Supreme
Court long ago held that the NLRB does not have the power to
regulate the substantive terms of collective bargaining agreements."
The Court should, therefore, analyze the issue in terms of striking
a balance between the State's interest in imposing these require-
ments on the provisions of the collective bargaining agreements"
and the federal interest in maintaining a bargaining process free
from substantive regulation."
ple, in Farmer v. Carpenters, Local 25, 430 U.S. 290 (1977), the Court ruled that a union
member's state suit against the union for intentional infliction of emotional distress was not
preempted by federal labor laws. In so holding, the Court acknowledged the vitality of the
Garmon doctrine, but ruled that the "state's interest in protecting the health and well-being
of its citizens" outweighed the possible effect on federal labor law that state regulation might
have. Id. at 303-04. For a discussion of the policies behind this state-protective approach to
federal preemption, see Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives on Federalism
and the Burger Court, 75 COLUM. L. Rav. 623 (1975) (hereinafter cited as Preemption
Doctrine].
49. This distinction may explain why neither the majority opinion nor the dissenting
opinions in Malone cited the Garmon decision.
50. NLRB v. Insurance Agents, 361 U.S. 477 (1960). The Court in Insurance Agents held
that when Congress enacted the NLRA, it was not concerned with the substantive terms upon
which the parties contracted. A cease and desist order issued by the Board to control union
pressure tactics during negotiations was viewed as an intrusion into the substantive aspects
of the bargaining process, in excess of the power conferred by the NLRA. Id. at 490.
51. Although the Supreme Court seldom articulates this balancing of the respective state
and federal interests, examination of the Court's decisions generally indicates that this factor
is the underlying basis for many decisions. See Comment, Federal Preemption: Govern-
mental Interests and the Role of the Supreme Court, 1966 DuKE L.J. 484, 489.
52. See Note, Federal Preemption and Collective Bargaining Agreements, 1966 Wis. L.
Rav. 532, in which it is noted that the only Supreme Court decision dealing with a State's
regulation of substantive terms of a labor agreement negotiated pursuant to the NLRA is
Local 24, Int'l. Bhd. of Teamsters v. Oliver, discussed at note 34 supra. Other decisions which
provide insight into the balance between federal labor policy and state interest involve the
1978-79
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In light of the foregoing principles of federal preemption, Malone,
at first glance, would appear to have very little impact in the labor
law area. By basing its decision on the presumed congressional au-
thorization of the Minnesota Pension Act as reflected in the Pension
Disclosure Act, the Court was able to avoid deciding the issue of
whether the Minnesota statute dealt with social interests so deeply
rooted in the State as to outweigh the policies of federal labor law,
thus bringing it within the recognized health and safety exception
to the preemption doctrine.53 Had the Court chosen this latter ap-
proach, they would have had an opportunity to review the scope of
the health and safety exception to federal preemption discussed in
Oliver.5' Such a review would undoubtedly have been a step toward
clarifying the labor preemption area, which at least one commenta-
tor has described as "riddled with exceptions."55
Instead, the Court chose the less convincing argument that Con-
gress somehow expressly authorized the states to regulate the sub-
stantive provisions of pension plans when it enacted the Pension
Disclosure Act. The majority found this congressional authoriza-
tion in the fact that Congress failed to enact substantive regulations
Court's interpretation of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1970). For example,
in Railway Employees Dept. v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956), the Court held that a State could
rot prohibit a "union shop" agreement made pursuant to the Railway Labor Act, which
expressly authorizes such agreements. The Court stated that "[a] union agreement made
pursuant to the Railway Labor Act has. . . the imprimatur of the federal law upon it and
.. .could not be made illegal nor vitiated by any provisions of the laws of a State." Id. at
232. See also California v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553 (1957) (terms of any collective bargaining
agreement negotiated by employees of a state-owned railroad take precedence over conflicting
provisions of state civil service laws).
53. This issue was extensively briefed by both parties, with appellant arguing that the
Pension Act was a valid police power enactment directed toward the health and well-being
of its citizens. Brief for Appellant at 40. The appellee argued that if the Court included the
Pension Act within the health and safety exception, virtually all aspects of the employment
relationship would be subject to state regulation, and the exception would swallow the rule.
Brief for Appellee at 28.
54. Although the Court in Local 24, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Oliver, 358 U.S; 283 (1958),
drew a sharp distinction between a collective bargaining agreement in conflict with a local
health and safety regulation and a situation in which the conflict is between a federally
sanctioned agreement and a state policy which specifically seeks to adjust commercial rela-
tionships, neither the scope nor the consequences of this distinction have ever been fully
defined.
55. Hooton, supra note 46, at 49.
56. The provisions and legislative history of the Pension Disclosure Act simply do not
support the conclusion of the majority. See the discussion at notes 58-62 and accompanying
text infra.
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when it enacted the Pension Disclosure Act." The legislative reports
which the majority cited in support of its conclusion do indicate that
Congress, in enacting the Pension Disclosure Act, did not intend to
substantively regulate pension plans, but merely intended to pro-
vide requirements for registration, reporting and disclosure." It does
not necessarily follow, however, that by preserving state laws affect-
ing the operation or administration of employee or pension plans59
Congress intended to authorize the type of substantive regulation
contemplated by the Minnesota Pension Act. 0 The legislative his-
tory is more supportive of the position that Congress felt that any
substantive regulation of pension plans was premature and that to
place substantive requirements on plans might unduly restrict their
development.8" If, indeed, Congress believed in 1958 that federal
regulation of the substantive provisions of pension plans might
impede their future development, it is unlikely that they intended
the preemption disclaimer in the Pension Disclosure Act to author-
ize the States to impose the very substantive regulations which were
viewed by the sponsors of the legislation as being premature. It
would appear, therefore, that the interpretation of the Pension Dis-
closure Act adopted by the court of appeals-namely, that the
57. 435 U.S. at 507.
58. See S. REP. No. 1440, supra note 29, at 4155.
59. 29 U.S.C. § 309(b) (1970).
60. At the time the 1958 Pension Disclosure Act was enacted by Congress, only six states
had statutes dealing with the regulation of pension plans. See Isaacson, Employee Welfare
and Pension Plans: Regulation and Protection of Employee Rights, 59 COLum. L. Rav. 97, 110
(1959). A review of these statutes demonstrates that none of them regulated substantive
aspects of pension plans such as funding or vesting requirements. Of the six statutes in force
in 1958, the most comprehensive was that enacted by New York. Like the other statutes, the
major emphasis of the New York law was to open the operation of pension funds to close
scrutiny by requiring the release of information through the filing of annual reports. Id. at
111. It is logical to assume that when Congress referred, in § 10(b) of the Pension Disclosure
Act, to "any present or future law ... of any State affecting the operation or administration
of employee welfare or pension benefit plans" (emphasis supplied), it had in mind the same
type of State regulatory laws as the six statutes in force in 1958.
61. One of the principal sponsors of the bill, Representative Teller, declared that "[o]ur
bill . . . provides solely for disclosure. It does not go into the field of regulation, not because
we do not believe that regulation is unnecessary [sic] but because we believe our further
legislative efforts should await further investigation." 104 CONG. Rc. 16421 (1958). See also
Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Welfare and Pension Plans Legislation of the Senate
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 134-36 (1957); Note,
Protection of Beneficiaries under Employee Benefit Plans, 58 COLUM. L. Rav. 78, 107 (1958)
("The chief objection advanced against immediate legislative adoption of substantive rules
is that they would be premature, placing benefit plans in a strait jacket before they had an
opportunity to find by experiment the most efficient and profitable modes of functioning").
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preemption disclaimer contemplated only the state regulations
dealing with management, disclosure and administration of pension
plans-is more consistent with the legislative history of that statute.
This legislative history indicates not only that Congress felt that
substantive legislation in the pension area was premature in 1958,
but also that Congress had every intention of imposing its own
substantive regulations after further investigation. 2
Deciding the Malone case on the basis of the health and safety
exception to federal preemption, rather than on the Pension Disclo-
sure Act interpretation, would have been a clearer indication of the
Burger Court's movement toward protection of the states' interest
in their police power regulations, which almost all of the Court's
non-labor law preemption decisions since 1973 have followed. 3
These decisions seem to indicate that the Burger Court is willing to
address questions of federal preemption with a greater eye toward
maintaining the inherent police power of the states to regulate ac-
tivities in which they have a high degree of interest, rather than
presuming that Congress, by occupying a field, intended to displace
all local regulation that directly or indirectly touches that field."
In light of this trend which signals the Burger Court's more lim-
ited application of the preemption doctrine when the validity of a
state's police power regulation is at stake, it is curious that the
Court in Malone so carefully avoided the necessity of deciding
whether Minnesota's regulation of pension plan terminations was a
valid exercise of its police power, and thus not preempted by the
NLRA. 5 Premising its decision on that basis would have been en-
tirely consistent with the Court's abrogation of the presumed
preemption doctrine, and would have been much more persuasive
62. This interpretation is further buttressed by the fact that Congress, in 1974, after years
of investigation and legislative hearings, did impose its own substantive regulations when it
enacted ERISA.
63. See, e.g., DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976) (state statute making it a crime for
an employer to knowingly hire an illegal alien was not preempted by Immigration Nationality
Act); Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973) (state statute regulating duplication of
musical recordings not preempted by federal copyright laws). See also Catz and Lenard,
supra note 20, at 319-20; Preemption Doctrine, supra note 48,at 639-53.
64. See Catz and Lenard, supra note 20, at 320.
65. There would have been much support for the proposition that the regulation of em-
ployee pension plan terminations concerned matters affecting the health, safety and welfare
of state citizens. As the Court noted in DeCanas, "States possess broad authority under their
police power to regulate the employment relationship to protect workers within the state."
424 U.S. at 356.
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than the decision based on an unconvincing interpretation of the
Pension Disclosure Act.6 This result would also have been an addi-
tional step toward a more concise clarification of the parameters of
the health and safety exception to federal preemption. 7
The real importance of Malone, therefore, lies not in the express
holding of the Court that prior to ERISA, pension plans were proper
subjects of state regulatory power, but rather in the fact that the
Court rejected the opportunity to decide whether state regulation of
pension plans should be included among the recognized exceptions
to labor law preemption."8
It appears that the Court is not as willing or eager to apply the
same state-protective preemption principles" in labor law cases as
it is in other areas of the law. The fact that the Court chose the
Pension Disclosure Act argument in Malone to avoid deciding the
health and safety issue is evidence of a conservatism in the labor
preemption area not present in other areas in which federal preemp-
tion is at issue. This reluctance of the Court to address the conten-
tion that the Minnesota Pension Act was within the health and
safety exception indicates that a state's interests in its police power
regulations must indeed be substantial before the Court will view
them as outweighing the federal labor policies contained in the pri-
visions of the NLRA. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court, in Malone,
declined to clarify how substantial these interests must be before
inclusion among the recognized exceptions to federal preemption is
justified.
James P. Hollihan
66. See notes 58-62 and accompanying text supra.
67. Of course, after the enactment of ERISA, it is clear that state regulation of pension
plans is expressly preempted by the federal law. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1975). Thus, the
narrow issue of whether pension plan regulation falls within the health and safety exception
to federal preemption is now a moot question. See note 40 supra.
68. Indeed, during oral argument, after a series of questions by which the Justices sought
to ascertain what appellant's view was of the outer limits of a state's regulatory power over
the employment relationship, Justice White remarked that the Court need not reach these
questions if they accepted the argument about the 1958 Pension Disclosure Act. See 1978
BNA Daily Labor Report, No. 7, p. A-10 (Jan. 11, 1978).
69. See text accompanying note 63 supra.

